After a weeks break we are back to look at updates for ClamAV, GnuTLS,
nginx, Samba and more, plus we briefly discuss the current 20.04 Mid-Cycle
Roadmap Review sprint for the Ubuntu Security Team
Show Notes
Overview
After a weeks break we are back to look at updates for ClamAV, GnuTLS,
nginx, Samba and more, plus we briefly discuss the current 20.04 Mid-Cycle
Roadmap Review sprint for the Ubuntu Security Team
UBSAN found possible buffer overflow due to failure to check lengths of
inputs to various functions - so applications using libnss for crypto
could be vulnerable to buffer overflow
Update marks SHA1 as being untrusted for digital signature operations -
SHA1 has been broken in theory for a while and 2017 Google showed the
first SHA1 collision - recently the first chosen-prefix attack was
demonstrated against SHA1 as well - demonstrated by creating a GPG key
which can impersonate another
As such GnuTLS will not trust SHA1 based digital signatures since these
can relatively easily be forged now (but not for an arbitrary input)
As such libraries / applications which use GnuTLS (libsoup, Epiphany)
will not trust SHA1 based digital signatures
HTTP request smuggling (Episode 52) - allowed attacker to read
unauthorized web pages where nginx is being fronted by a load balanced
when used with certain error_page configurations
observe timing of signature generation on known messages to indicate
the bit-length of the random nonce scalar during scalar multiplication
on an elliptic curve - full private key is able to be recovered using
lattice techniques
Library providing common BSD C functions which are not available on Linux
(strlcpy() etc)
OOB read (crash -> DoS)
Off-by-one in fgetwln() (get line of wide characters from a stream) ->
heap buffer overflow -> crash / RCE (doesn’t appear to be used by any
software in Ubuntu)
Crash if fail to convert characters at log level 3
Does not automatically replicate ACLs which are set to inherit down a
subtree (unable to be easily backported to Xenial so only fixed on
Bionic, Disco and Eoan - instead can workaround by manually replication
ACLs from one DC to another for a given naming context)
May fail to properly validate signatures in a particularly crafted SAML
document by using the wrong data - so could assert a document has been
fully signed when only a part of it has
Goings on in Ubuntu Security Community
Mid cycle product roadmap sprint [17:18]
Security team presents progress on plans for Ubuntu 20.04 Focal Fossa -
ie. ESM offerings, AppArmor features, snapd security features, Ubuntu
Core security features, MIR security reviews progress etc
Represented by Joe McManus, Mark Morlino, Chris Coulson and John Johansen