Thumbnailers could possibly escape bubblewrap sandbox by using TIOCSTI
ioctl to send characters to the controlling terminals input buffer and
hence escape the sandbox
Requires to compromise a thumbnailer in the first place so less impact
Heap based buffer overflow when parsing HTTP response code - would
potentially write an unlimited amount of attacker controlled data to the
heap for a 10-byte long buffer
Crash -> DoS, RCE
Fixed to properly parse and expect at most a 3 digit long response code
Research from Marcus Brinkmann showed it was possible to create an
encrypted email with a zero-length encrypted section along with
unencrypted contents which Evolution (and other email clients) would show
as being encrypted.
Mail clients call out to gpg (gnupg) to decrypt the email but are lax in
parsing GPGs output and so confuse the whole email as being encrypted
Due to SW arch of evolution, part of this fix is done in Evolution itself
(to better highlight to the user that the email contains unencrypted
portions) and part is done in the backend (Evolution Data Server) to
properly parse output of gnupg
Seccomp allows to write policies to act on system calls arguments via
BPF - includes comparison operators like less than (LT) etc - Jann Horn
discovered that on 64-bit platforms it did not generate correct BPF to
perform comparisons correctly
In this case, the updates from upstream relied on other upstream changes
so we chose to upgrade seccomp entirely rather than try and backport the
fixes as they were too involved and so less risk overall in upgrading the
version than in backporting