Episode 120 - bluetooth spec issue around pairing takeover plus a
possible double-free in gattool that is likely quite hard to exploit due
to time window race between the two free() calls
Low level crypto library used by lots of packages - chrony, dnsmasq,
lighttpd, qemu, squid, supertuxkart
Last covered just a few weeks ago in Episode 112 - is someone taking a
closer look at this library?
Bleichenbacher type side-channel base on a padding oracle attack in
endian conversion of RSA decrypted PKCS#1 v1.5 data - requires to run a
process on the same physical core as the victim - but could then allow
the plaintext to be extracted
RSA algo possible crash which is able to be triggered on decryption of
manipulated ciphertext
Changes required for both of these are too intrusive to backport for the
older releases (e.g. 16.04 ESM) so suggest to upgrade to a newer Ubuntu
release if you are using nettle on these older releases and are concerned
about possible attacks
Episode 106 - BootHole 2021 updates published to the security pocket
Vulns included the ability to load ACPI tables, UAF in rmmod, buffer
overflow in command-line parser, cutmem command boot locking bypass, heap
buffer overflow in option parser and menu rendering OOB write -> RCE —>@@
all could lead to a bypass of secure boot protections
Includes one grub - ie. same grub efi binary used across all recent
Ubuntu releases
STARTTLS plaintext command injection vuln via SMTP, plus if a local
attacker could write files to the disk, they could supply their own keys
to validate their own supplied JSON Web Token and hence login as any
other user and then access their emails if using OAUTH2
78.11.0 - usual mix of untrusted content/web framework issues inherited
from Firefox, plus fixes for OpenPGP key handling, message signature
TOCTTOU-type condition due to writing out signatures to disk that then
could be replaced before being verified, UX issue in display of inline
signed/encrypted messages with additional unprotected parts
Used for access to discourse.ubuntu.com, Launchpad, ubuntuforums,
publishers on the Snap Store etc
Allows to use a phone / desktop TOTP app as second factor, or Yubikey
TOTP etc
Has actually been supported since 2014 but only available to a beta
testing group plus for all Canonical employees, due to challenges in
account recovery
Since Ubuntu One purposefully doesn’t store any real identifying
information (name, email, username) we can’t easily verify account
holders if they lose the 2FA device
The intent is to be robust even in the event that a users email address
is compromised
Now have a comprehensive code recovery experience including printable
backup codes and mechanisms in place to encourage users to exercise
backup codes so that users can feel confident in using these if they need
to (ie where did I put my backup codes again..?)